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Resisting Moral Wiggle Room: How Robust is Reciprocity? 
 
Several studies have shown that dictator-game giving declines substantially if the dictator can 
exploit situational “excuses” for not being generous. In this experimental study we investigate 
if this result extends to more natural social interactions involving reciprocal behavior. We 
provide the second mover in a reciprocal game with an excuse for not reciprocating, an 
excuse which has previously been shown to strongly reduce giving in dictator games. We do 
not find that the availability of the excuse has any effect at all on reciprocal behavior, and 
conclude that reciprocity is a more stable disposition than dictator game generosity. 
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 1 Introduction
A large experimental literature has shown that people do not behave in line with the predictions
of purely selsh utility maximization, but that they exhibit social preferences; that is, people are
willing to give up substantial sums to others with no immediate gain to themselves (Camerer,
2003). Thus, the argument goes, people care about fair and equal outcomes, and about the
payos of others.
More recently however, some researchers have questioned this conclusion. They used vari-
ations of the dictator game, one of the workhorses of behavioral economics, and show that
generous behavior is volatile. Homan et al. (1996) use a strict double blind protocol, and nd
substantially reduced giving. Cherry et al. (2002) nd that if dictators have earned their wealth
by answering quiz questions, giving is essentially eliminated. In Lazear et al. (2009) subjects
have the choice whether to play or, against a small fee, to \opt out" from the dictator game.
Sharing then declines from 61% in the standard, to 23% in the opt-out treatment. Bardsley
(2008) and List (2007) show that when there is the possibility of taking from the partner, giving
declines substantially, and taking is prevalent. Dana et al. (2007) make available various types
of moral excuses for selsh behavior, and nd that such \moral wiggle room" reduces the num-
ber of givers by half. They argue that a main driver of generous behavior is that people \dislike
appearing unfair, either to themselves or others" (Dana et al., 2007: 67, emphasis ours).
These ndings are intriguing, but the relevance of the dictator game to real-life decision
making can be questioned. A typical dictator game provides very little context or structure that
could guide subjects in their moral decision-making. Subjects are matched with a stranger about
whom they know nothing at all. In real interactions, people will have at least some information
about what kind of person their partner is. This goes without saying for family and friends
or colleagues. But even in one-shot interactions with sales people or restaurant waiters, people
have some information about the friendliness or quality of service of the other party, and they
will make their actions contingent on it. Such knowledge about the interaction partner is likely
to make a large dierence, because people condition their cooperativeness on their partner's
behavior. It has been argued convincingly that reciprocity is one of the core motives of human
behavior (see Sobel, 2005 for an overview of the arguments). In light of this, the dictator game
can be considered a poor indicator of real-world social preferences.
We test whether in these more natural settings that involve reciprocal behavior the inclusion
of wiggle room undermines generous behavior to a similar extent as in the dictator setting. To
do so, we adapt a treatment used by Dana et al. (2007, DKW hereafter). The dictator has the
choice between a fair (5;5) and an unfair (6;1) division. Moral wiggle room is introduced as
follows: if the dictator does not make her decision fast enough, a computer cuts in, choosing the
2fair and unfair choice with equal probability. The receiver cannot tell who made the decision,
and thus cannot infer whether the dictator was selsh or slow. A dictator who would want
to choose selshly but is concerned about her self-image could thus simply wait and delegate
the unfair choice to the computer. In this \plausible deniability treatment" (PDT), 7 out of
29 (24%) of the dictators were cut o by the timer. Of those that were not cut-o, 12 out of
22 (55%) selected the unfair division, relative to only 26% in the baseline treatment where no
excuse was available.
We use the plausible deniability (PD) treatment from DKW in two dierent reciprocity
games: the trust game and the moonlighting game. The latter (explained below) looks at
negative reciprocity and is thus the mirror image of the trust game. In both games, we compare
the behavior of second movers in a baseline treatment and in the PD treatment. Because the
second mover has information about the rst-mover's decision to either trust or take money,
this game provides more social context to the interaction than the DKW study.
Our data reveal no dierence in reciprocal behavior between the baseline and the PD treat-
ment. In the trust game, there is neither a signicant dierence between trustworthiness between
the treatments, nor between trust levels, indicating that rst-movers correctly anticipate that
second-movers will not use the moral wiggle room provided in the PD treatment. Similarly,
in the moonlighting game, levels of punishment do not dier between the treatments, nor does
rst-stage taking-behavior dier. We conclude that the strong eects of excuses and moral
wiggle room on dictator game giving do not transfer to reciprocal social interactions.
Our results are stronger than those found by Lazear et al. (2009) in a double dictator
game. Here, subjects had to decide whether to share $2 with their partner, who subsequently
would play the role of a dictator in the opt-out game described above. The results seem to
indicate that if subjects chose to share the $2, the partner was subsequently less likely to behave
opportunistically and to opt out of the dictator game, but the results are not statistically
signicant. In our setting we nd that second-movers do not use moral wiggle room at all. The
reason may be that our design implements a more natural reciprocal interaction. In contrast
to Lazear et al. (2009), rst movers in our design knew that there would be a second round,
and also play for substantially higher amounts of money. Combined, this means that the second




We investigated the impact of moral wiggle room on reciprocal behavior by means of two stan-
dard experimental games: the trust game and the moonlighting game. In the trust game (Berg et.
al., 1995), which allows for positive reciprocity, the second mover faces a similar decision as the
dictator in the dictator game. The only dierence is that she has additional information about
her interaction partner, namely whether the partner was trusting or not. The experimental pro-
tocol we implemented in our study was as follows: Two players each start with an endowment
of 20 units of experimental currency (ECU). Player One can choose to transfer either nothing,
10 ECU, or her whole endowment of 20 ECU to player Two. The amount transferred (if any)
is tripled by the experimenter, so that player Two receives either 0, 30 or 60 ECU respectively
in addition to her own endowment. In case player One decides not to transfer anything, the
game ends and both players earn 20 ECU as nal earnings. If player One transfers a positive
amount, player Two faces the binary choice of whether or not to return part of her wealth back
to player One. If she receives 30 ECU, she can send back 20 ECU, in which case both players
end up with nal earnings of 30 ECU each. If she receives 60 ECU, she can send back 40 ECU,
in which case both players end up with nal earnings of 40 ECU. Alternatively, in both cases
player Two can decide not to return anything, yielding nal earnings of 10 (50) and 0 (80) ECU
for player One (Two), respectively.
To analyze the impact on negative reciprocity, we implemented a variation of the moon-
lighting game (Abbink et al., 2000) as the mirror image of the trust game. In this game, both
players start with an endowment of 40 ECU. Player One can choose to take from player Two
an amount of either 0, 10 or 20 ECU, which is transferred from player Two's account to the
account of player One. In case player One takes 0 ECU, the game ends and both players earn 40
ECU as nal earnings. If player One takes a positive amount, player Two can decide whether or
not to `punish' player One. Particularly, if player One takes 10 ECU, player Two can decide to
subtract 15 ECU from player One's account at a cost of 5 ECU to herself. Player One then ends
up with 40+10 15 = 35 ECU and player Two with 40 10 5 = 25 ECU as nal earnings. If
player One takes 20 ECU, player Two can decide to subtract 30 ECU from player One's account
at a cost of 10 ECU to herself. In this case, player One ends up with 40 + 20   30 = 30 ECU
and player Two with 40 20 10 = 10 ECU. Alternatively, in both cases player Two can again
decide not to subtract anything, yielding nal earnings of 50 (30) and 60 (20) ECU to player
One (Two), respectively.
We implemented two treatment conditions in the experiment. In the control treatment,
4subjects played both games sequentially either as player One or as player Two without role
reversal. Subjects were randomly matched with dierent partners in both games. To control
for order eects we randomly varied which game was played rst across sessions. Subjects were
informed about the second game only after the rst game was played. Further, they did not
receive feedback about their partner's behavior in the rst game before the second game was
played. We used the strategy method for player Two in both games, i.e. subjects in the role of
player Two were asked to make a decision for each possible case before knowing the decision of
player One. Earnings were determined on the basis of these decisions together with the actual
decision of player One.
In the second treatment, the plausible deniability (PD) treatment, everything was the same
as in the control treatment except for one important variation. Before subjects in the role of
player Two made a decision, they were informed that the computer would pick a random time
between 0 and 10 seconds. If the subject had not taken a decision before that time, the computer
would implement a binding decision by randomly choosing one of the possible choices with equal
probability (in the trust game: zero vs. positive back transfer; in the moonlighting game: no
punishment vs. punishment). Player One was informed that player Two faces the possibility
of being cut-o by the computer, but that she would not learn whether the cut-o actually
occurred, i.e. whether player Two or whether the computer took the decision. This information
was also given to player Two.1
We used the PD treatment as a moral wiggle room for the following reasons. First, as DKW
show the PD treatment signicantly reduces fair behavior in the dictator game. Second, in
contrast to some of the other manipulations, the PD treatment is easy to transfer to situations
involving reciprocity. Third, the PD treatment simulates the excuse of \time pressure", which is
an often used moral excuse for not conforming to moral standards and provides a recognizable
situation to the subjects.
2.2 Hypotheses
In the trust game, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium based on money-maximizing
preferences predicts that player Two never returns any positive amount and hence player One
does not transfer anything. Similarly, in the moonlighting game, money-maximization yields
that player Two never punishes and therefore player One takes the largest possible amount.
1Following DKW we calibrated the timer in the PD treatment such that everybody who did not want to be cut
o had ample time to make a decision. The cuto was determined according to a truncated normal distribution
with support on [0;10], the mean at 4 seconds, and a standard deviation of 0.3 seconds. The minimum cut-o
time was 3.2 seconds in our experiment.
5The prediction is dierent if subjects have reciprocal preferences (e.g., Falk and Fischbacher,
2006). If player Two is a reciprocator, she will return the fair share in the trust game and will
punish unfair taking in the moonlighting game. In a subgame perfect equilibrium of the trust
game, player One will therefore transfer the largest possible amount, whereas in the moonlighting
game she will refrain from taking anything in equilibrium.
Based on the existing evidence on the trust and the moonlighting game, we expect that in
the control treatment, (i) a substantial share of player Two subjects behave reciprocally, and
(ii) that this is anticipated by many subjects in the role of player One. We therefore expect
strictly positive transfers in the trust game and less than maximal taking in the moonlighting
game. In both games we expect that the behavior of player One is reciprocated on average by
the behavior of player Two.
With respect to the PD treatment, our point of reference is the DKW study, who document
an increase of unfair outcomes in the dictator game from 26% in the baseline to 59% in the PD
treatment. The observed increase is driven by two eects: First, about a fourth of the subjects
are actually cut-o by the computer, which increases the number of unfair outcomes; second,
subjects who are not cut-o also behave more selshly.2 DKW interpret the second eect as
evidence for moral wiggle room making the responsibility for unfair behavior more dicult to
attribute. The rst eect can be interpreted as evidence for a deliberate strategy of protecting
a dictator's self-image.
Our study is motivated by the hypothesis that reciprocity (both in the positive and the
negative domain) is much more robust than dictator game giving. We therefore expect no
signicant dierences with regard to the degree of unfair behavior in the PD treatment compared
to the control treatment. Moreover, we expect that less subjects choose to be cut-o than in
the DKW study.
3 Results
The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher 2007) and conducted at the Frankfurt
Laboratory of Experimental Economics (FLEX) at Goethe-University. 256 Subjects participated
in the experiment, 128 in the control and 128 in the PD treatment, earning an average of 14.32
Euro (minimum 8.50 Euro, maximum 22 Euro).3 The experiment was framed neutrally and
lasted approximately 45 minutes. A translation of the written instructions is available from the
authors upon request. We did not nd consistent order eects and hence pool the data for the
2As in our experiment, the timer in the DKW study was calibrated such that subjects who did not want to
be cut-o had sucient time to make a decision (see previous footnote).
3The show-up fee was 4 Euro and one ECU was worth 0.15 Euro.
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3.1 Behavior of player Two
Our main hypotheses relate to the behavior of player Two. The left panel of Figure 1 shows that
in the trust game there is no big dierence in the level of trustworthiness between the control
and the PD treatment.
Figure 1: Behavior of second movers in the trust game (left panel) and moonlighting game (right
panel).
Indeed, using a Fisher exact test we cannot reject the Null-hypothesis that the probability
of trustworthiness is the same in both treatments (P = 0:85 if player One transfers 10, P = 0:59
if player One transfers 20). The PD treatment similarly fails to inuence punishment decisions
in the moonlighting game as is displayed in the right panel of Figure 1. We cannot reject the
Null-hypothesis that there is no dierence in punishment behavior between the two treatments
(Fisher exact test, P = 0:42 if player One takes 10, P = 0:84 if player One takes 20).
The lack of treatment eect is also observed when we look at the timing of decisions. In
contrast to the DKW experiment where 24% of the subjects were \cut-o" by the computer,
in our experiment only 2 out of 256 decisions5 were taken by the computer. This suggests that
4There is one exception to this claim. We found that a second mover in the trust game was less likely to be
trustworthy if the rst mover had stolen from him or her during the preceding moonlighting game.
5In the PD treatment, there were 64 subjects playing 2 games who, using the strategy method, took 2 decisions
7subjects did not want to delegate the decision to the computer (that implemented the selsh
choice with probability 0:5) in order to protect their self-image.
We nd a weakly signicant correlation between positive and negative reciprocity when
we compare individual second-mover behavior across games, conditional on rst-mover choices.
Both in case player One transfers/takes 10 and in case he transfers/takes 20, Spearman's rank
correlation coecient between positive and negative reciprocity is 0:15 and is signicant at the
10% level (P = 0:082;P = 0:081, respectively). This correlation is somewhat higher than in
Dohmen et al. (2009) who document a correlation of only 0:024 between positive and negative
reciprocity based on questionnaire data from a large representative survey.
In sum, the results clearly corroborate our hypothesis that moral wiggle room has no eect
on reciprocal behavior.
3.2 Behavior of player One
Do subjects in the role of player One anticipate that moral wiggle room does not aect reci-
procity? One could speculate, for example, that player One may expect player Two in the PD
treatment to be less trustworthy, because she faces moral wiggle room. Figure 2 shows that this
is not the case.
Figure 2: Behavior of rst movers in the trust game (left panel) and moonlighting game (right
panel).
in each game.
8We cannot reject the Null-hypothesis that player-One behavior is the same in both treat-
ments, neither in the trust game nor in the moonlighting game (Fisher exact test, P = 1 in the
trust game, P = 0:89 in the moonlighting game).
4 Conclusion
The non-robustness of dictator game giving has led some to suggest that preferences for fairness
are partly \illusionary" (Dana et al., 2007). The results that we have presented in this paper
show that this conclusion should be qualied. We do not nd that the inclusion of moral wiggle
room which provides an excuse for nasty behavior and reduces social image concerns, has any
eect on the incidence of reciprocal behavior. This suggests that reciprocal preferences are
stronger, or at least less manipulable, than preferences for generosity in dictator games. To
the extent that the former are more relevant in most daily interactions than the latter, as we
have argued above, this means that our results reinforce the relevance of the social preferences
paradigm.
Thus, the nature of social preferences depends on the social context of interaction. Pro-social
behavior towards complete strangers is weak, as evidenced by the manipulability of the dictator
game results. However, this research shows that people are strongly motivated to cooperate
with those willing to cooperate with them. Similarly, people will punish those who have hurt
them, regardless of the circumstances. These preferences, shaped by tens of thousands of years
of evolution, do resist some wiggle room.
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